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PREDICTING THE APPLICATION OF VICARIOUS
LIABILITY TO FIXED BASE OPERATORS: STILL
GUESSWORK AFTER ALL THESE YEARS
LARRY S. KAPLAN*
T HE FIXED BASE OPERATOR (FBO)1 is fast becoming a
target for blame in virtually every general aviation acci-
dent case.2 Almost as a matter of course, today's victims of
small aircraft accidents file suit against the FBO in their at-
tempts to recover damages. This practice seems to be followed
whether or not the FBO has had any actual responsibility for
the victim's injuries, and is fostered in large measure by the
pervasiveness of statutes and court holdings which make the
owner and lessor of aircraft vicariously liable for the negli-
gence of the pilot.
The term "vicarious" means to fill the place of another.8
When liability is imposed vicariously, legal responsibility is
extended from the actual wrongdoer to an innocent person or
entity designated by law to fill the wrongdoer's place.' The
dilemma that is presented to insurers and lawyers involved in
the defense of actions brought against the FBO is that in
many states, due to inconsistent court decisions and vague
* B.A. 1972, University of Southern California; J.D. 1975 University of Chicago.
Member Illinois Bar. The author would like to thank James Murphy (J.D. DePaul
University, 1981) and Charles Eggert (J.D. John Marshall Law School, 1981) for their
research assistance.
See text accompanying notes 4-10 infra.
The Civil Aeronautics Board defines "general aviation" as all civil aircraft except
those used by general carriers.
3 WEBSTERS NEW WORLD DiCTIONARY 1581 (2d ed. 1978).
4 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 458-59 (4th ed. 1971) (hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
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statutory language, it is difficult to predict whether or not the
courts will impose vicarious liability on the fixed base opera-
tor for accidents which are caused by pilot negligence.
Because of the formidable financial exposure that accompa-
nies an aviation disaster, there is a compelling need to be able
to gauge the direction in which a court is likely to turn on the
issue of vicarious liability. The purpose of this article is to ex-
amine the history and present status of the law as it relates to
the vicarious liability of lessors and owners of light aircraft for
the negligence of renter pilots. It is hoped that this type of
review will not only provide some insight into the likely trend
of future decisions, but that it will also assist those involved
in the defense of fixed base operators in narrowing the range
of unpredictability inherent in our present body of law.
I. THE FIXED BASE OPERATOR GENERALLY
One of the basic functions of the standard FBO is the leas-
ing of aircraft to renter pilots at an hourly charge. The FBO
either owns its own aircraft or possesses it on a leaseback
agreement with the owner.' In carrying out its daily opera-
tions, the FBO owes the same duty of reasonable care to the
public that the common law of negligence imposes on every-
one.' For example, the courts impose a responsibility on the
FBO to maintain its aircraft in an airworthy condition.7 The
courts also require that the FBO refuse to rent to persons
whom the FBO knows or should know to be reckless.8 In the
B Leaseback agreements are common in the general aviation industry. They typi-
cally involve a contract between the owner of an airplane and an FBO whereby the
FBO, in exchange for being given possession of the aircraft and the right to rent it
out at an hourly charge, agrees to maintain the aircraft and to provide the owner with
a percentage rebate of the rental income. By this means, the owner of a small aircraft
who does not use his aircraft regularly can help defray the expenses of owning and
maintaining an airplane.
6 PROSSER, supra note 4, at 149-66.
7 D'Aquilla v. Pryor, 122 F. Supp. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). In D'Aquilla, the court held
that where the rental aircraft is airworthy and properly maintained; the renter pilot is
duly qualified; and aviation is not considered to be an ultra-hazardous activity; the
owner will not be held responsible for an accident occasioned by the pilot's
negligence.
' See Herrick v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., 1932 U.S. Av. REP. 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1932), one of the first courts to deal with the concept of negligent entrustment.
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event that an accident occurs, either as a result of a defective
condition in the aircraft of which the FBO should have been
aware, or because the renter pilot was unqualified for the
given conditions and the FBO should have known about this
lack of qualification, the courts will impose liability on the
FBO for all damages which result.' The courts reason in such
situations that had the FBO exercised reasonable care, the ac-
cident never would have occurred.
Vicarious liability goes beyond the "reasonable care" stan-
dard. When imposed, it extends blame to the FBO for con-
duct over which the FBO had no control. In a vicarious liabil-
ity state, the FBO may take all necessary precautions before
renting his aircraft, but if an accident occurs because of an
unforeseeable pilot error, the FBO will nevertheless bear full
liability for the accident.10
An FBO conducting his business in a careful and reasonable
manner in a jurisdiction which does not impose vicarious lia-
bility can avoid negligence liability for any accident which oc-
curs through the operation of his aircraft. Where vicarious lia-
bility is imposed, however, there is nothing an FBO can do to
avoid having to answer for the negligence of another. It is pre-
cisely because of this lack of control an FBO has over his own
There, it was held that where a student pilot was involved in a mid-air collision, if it
was found that the owner should have known of the pilot's lack of familiarity with
the rules of aerial navigation, then the owner would be liable for the pilot's negli-
gence. Id.
' Anderson Aviation Sales Co., Inc. v. Perez, 19 Ariz. App. 422, 508 P.2d 87 (1973).
In Perez, the renter pilot was not in compliance with FAR 61.47(b) dealing with night
flying experience. The court felt that the FBO was responsible for negligent entrust-
ment for any one of the following reasons: (1) Allowing their receptionist to handle
the rental arrangements; (2) Insufficient checking of the pilot's currency with the
FARs; (3) No checkout for night flying; (4) Allowing the pilot to take off without
filing a flight report; (5) Failure to notify the pilot of weather over the proposed desti-
nation airport and failure to notify the pilot that the destination airport had a prob-
lem with its lights. 508 P.2d at 92. See also George v. Tonjes, 414 F. Supp. 1199
(W.D. Wisc. 1976) where a Federal District Court in Wisconsin held that a complaint
against the lessors of an aircraft for an injury resulting from an aircraft accident was
sufficient where it alleged that the lessors leased a defective aircraft, said defect being
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 1201-02. But see Rushing v. Interna-
tional Underwriters, Inc., 604 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.- Dallas 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) where the Texas Aviation Court of Civil Appeals held that an FBO had no
duty to check out a rental pilot in a Cessna 182 before leasing him the plane.
" See Appendix infra.
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legal destiny that lawyers and insurers working on behalf of
these operators must be in a position to know when and where
vicarious liability will be imposed.11
II. Vic mous LIABILITY: A HISTORY
The Uniform Aeronautics Act, promulgated in 1922 by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws,' 2 made owners, operators, and lessees of aircraft abso-
lutely liable for injuries which resulted from the operation of
their aircraft.' s At that early time in the history of aviation,
aircraft use was considered to be an ultrahazardous activity
"I Financial Responsibility Laws pertaining to aircraft ownership have been
adopted by a number of states. Even where adopted, however, Financial Responsibil-
ity Laws do not settle the question of vicarious liability of the aircraft owner for pilot
negligence. The standard financial responsibility law requires the owner or lessor of
an aircraft to provide insurance to each renter pilot for the renter pilot's own negli-
gence. If the owner or lessor violates a state Financial Responsibility Law by not
providing the renter pilot insurance, the penalty is typically the suspension of the
owner's operating privileges. Financial Responsibility Laws do not impose liability on
the FBO for the pilot's negligence in the event of a violation, nor do they require that
the FBO's insurer indemnify the pilot where the FBO had failed to obtain insurance
for the renter pilot. Therefore, even in states that have a Financial Responsibility
Law for aircraft owners and lessors, the question of whether the owner can be held
vicariously liable for the pilot's negligence will continue to be an issue where the own-
er has violated the Financial Responsibility Law or where the owner's own insurance
coverage is greater than that procured for the renter pilot. Also, even where the own-
er or lessor has complied with the state Financial Responsibility Law and where sub-
stantial coverage has been procured for the renter pilot, victims of aviation disasters
will continue to seek recovery from the owner or lessor, in addition to that which they
can obtain from the pilot, if the nature of the state law on aircraft owner liability
might be interpreted as imposing vicarious liability for pilot negligence. In this age of
astronomical verdict awards, accident victims are sure to include all parties in their
lawsuits from whom recovery can be achieved. While Financial Responsibility Laws,
where complied with, provide a guaranteed fund for accident victims, they will not
prevent accident victims from also going after the owner or lessor if such an action
has any chance of success. They therefore do not alleviate the confusion created by
liability laws which are less than clear on the issue of vicarious liability. See Com-
ment, Lessor Liability in Aircraft Rental, 42 J. AIR L. & COM. 447, 452 (1976).1I NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PRO-
CREDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING 105-06, 313-28 (1922).
is Uniform Aeronautics Act § 5 (act withdrawn 1943). Section 5 of the Act read as
follows: "The owner of every aircraft which is operated over the lands or waters of
this state is absolutely liable for injuries to person or property on the land or water
beneath, caused by the ascent, descent or flight of the aircraft . . . whether such
owner was negligent or not, ... "
LIABILITY OF FIXED BASE OPERATORS
which required the imposition of liability regardless of fault.1
By definition, an ultrahazardous activity was beyond the
safety control of its participants.15 Therefore, one who chose
to engage in such an activity must have been prepared to ac-
cept responsibility for any harm which resulted, regardless of
that participant's complete freedom from negligence.
Eventually, twenty-two states adopted the Uniform Aero-
nautics Act imposing vicarious liability on owners, operators
and lessees of aircraft."6 By 1943, however, the Act was with-
drawn as obsolete.17 Implicit in its withdrawal, was the con-
sensus that flying an airplane was no longer an ultrahazardous
activity.'" This opinion was echoed in the 1954 California
case of Boyd v. White,'9 in which the court stated, "the opera-
tion of an airplane in the year 1954 is not such a dangerous
activity that it can be placed in this [ultrahazardous activity]
category."20
Ironically, at a time when certain jurists and legal scholars
were taking aviation out of the ultrahazardous activity cate-
gory because of the technical and safety advancements that
had occurred between 1922 and the post-World War II era,
other legal authorities were taking the opposite approach. The
Restatement of Torts which was in effect at the time of the
1954 decision in Boyd took the position that:
Section 520 of the Restatement of Torts defines an ultrahazardous activity as
one which "(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chat-
tels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of utmost care, and (b) is
not a matter of public usage." See also section 519 in effect in 1954 which states "one
who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another . . . although the ut-
most care is exercised to prevent harm." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1938).
Is Id.
Is Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont and
Wisconsin.
17 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING 66-67, 148, 305-07 (1943).
18 Whitehead, Jr., Legal Liability of Owners and Operators of Aircraft in General
Aviation for Damages to Third Parties, 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 17 (1963).
19 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954).
10 276 P.2d at 100.
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[Alviation in its present stage of development is ul-
trahazardous because even the best constructed and main-
tained aeroplane is so incapable of complete control that flying
creates a risk that the plane even though carefully constructed,
maintained and operated, may crash to the injury of persons,
structures and chattels on the land over which the flight is
made."1
The Civil Aeronautics Act, 2 adopted by Congress in 1938,
deemed any person who "authorizes" the operation of an air-
craft, to be engaged in "the operation of aircraft" for the pur-
pose of applying the rules and penalties contained in the
Act.2 3  As will be discussed, this provision has been inter-
preted by a number of courts as making the owners and les-
sors of aircraft responsible for pilot negligence." The language
relating to owner responsibility was not modified when it was
readopted as the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.15 The post-
World War II era brought with it, therefore, more than one
legal viewpoint as to the degree of hazard associated with nor-
mal aircraft use. This divergent viewpoint resulted in incon-
sistent application of liability standards to owners and lessors
of aircraft. Traced, in large measure, to the Civil Aeronautics
Act and the vague and ambiguous language contained therein,
this inconsistency has persisted to present times.
III. THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT AND ITS PROGENY
A. Vicarious Liability Pursuant to Federal and State "Op-
eration of Aircraft" Provisions
The Civil Aeronautics Act,26 under its definitional provi-
sions, explained "operation of aircraft" as follows:
"Operation of aircraft" or "operate aircraft" means the use of
aircraft for the purpose of air navigation and includes the navi-
" RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520, Comment (b) (1938).
49 U.S.C. § 401 (1938) (repealed 1958).
I d. § 401(26).
See notes 32-59 infra.
" Ch. 1, § 101 (26), 72 Stat. 737 (1958) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1301(31)
(Supp. 1981)).
6 49 U.S.C. § 401 (1938) (repealed 1958).
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gation of aircraft. Any person who causes or authorizes the op-
eration of aircraft, whether with or without the right of legal
control (in the capacity of owner, lessee, or otherwise) of the
aircraft, shall be deemed to be engaged in the operation of air-
craft within the meaning of this Act.
7
Congress apparently had two purposes for the passage of this
section of the Act. The first purpose was to make it clear that
regardless of whether a pilot is the owner, lessee, permissive
or non-permissive user of his aircraft, he will be subject to the
rules and penalties contained in the Act.28 The second pur-
pose was also to subject those persons who authorize aircraft
use, whether or not they are the ones who actually operate the
aircraft, to the rules and penalties contained in the Act."
This application presumably would include owners and lessors
who lease their aircraft to renter pilots. What is not made
clear by the terms of this section is whether Congress in-
tended to make the person who "authorizes" the aircraft's use
equally responsible with the operator for operator error, or
whether the intent was simply to make the owner subject to
the rules and penalties for conduct over which he has some
control.
The Civil Aeronautics Act became the model of many state
aviation statutes,80 and in 1958, the Federal Aviation Act
adopted the "operation of aircraft" provision, word for word.31
.7 Id. § 401(26).
iS The text uses the term "apparently" because a close review of the legislative
history of the Civil Aeronautics Act reveals that the purpose behind the particular
wording of the "operation of aircraft" provision was never discussed in published de-
bates. Senator McCarran (Nevada), one of the Congress' more outspoken members
about the proposed Act, best summed up the mood and intent of Congress at the
time of the Act's passage. "In thinking of safety in aviation we must consider not only
the aircraft but also the facilities, personnel, and appurtenances, both in the air and
on the ground, that enter into or in any way affect the operation and maintenance of
aircraft." 83 CONG. REC. 6631 (1938). In mirroring the Congressional mood, Senator
McCarran expressed the intent of Congress to adopt a pervasive piece of legislation




SI Ch. 1, § 101(26), 72 Stat. 737 (1958) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1301(31)
(Supp. 1981)).
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Unfortunately, this wide-spread reliance on vague and ambig-
uous statutory language has resulted in years of chaos, confu-
sion and inconsistency on the part of the nation's courts in
interpreting the language of the provision. As a result, at pres-
ent the ability to predict with certainty when and where vica-
rious liability will be applied to the owners and lessors of air-
craft is not in keeping with that which a nation's body of law
is designed to provide.
It is somewhat surprising that it took fifteen years after the
passage of the Act of 1938, and the subsequent adoption by
various states of identical aviation statutes, for the language
contained in the "operation of aircraft" provision to meet its
first judicial test. That test occurred in Hoebee v. Howe, 2
where the New Hampshire Supreme Court looked to the lan-
guage in the "operation of aircraft" provision of the Civil Aer-
onautics Act, and the identical provision in the New Hamp-
shire state code, 8 to impose liability on the owner of an
aircraft when a negligent, low flying pilot caused a horse to
bolt and injure the plaintiff's son.3 4 The court, in expressing
its opinion that language in the respective statutes placed the
same responsibility on the person who authorizes aircraft use
as it does on the actual operator of the aircraft, stated:
It seems to us from reading our act that the intent of our legis-
lature is clearly to place responsibility on the owner, even
though he be without control, for the conduct of one to whom
he entrusts the plane. The language is unequivocal and without
qualification expressed or reasonably to be implied.3 5
In the year following Hoebee, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in Hays v. Morgan,86 looked to a Mississippi statute3 7
which mirrored the "operation of aircraft" provision of the
Civil Aeronautics Act to affirm the imposition of liability on
the owner of a cropdusting plane for the negligence of the pi-
ss 98 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223 (1953).
33 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422:3 (1971).
" 97 A.2d at 224.
35 Id. at 225.
- 211 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955).
37 MIss. CODE ANN. § 7536-26(9) (1942).
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lot." Two years after Hays, the Iowa Supreme Court, in
Lamasters v. Snodgrass,"9 relied upon an Iowa statute0 which
again copied the "operation of aircraft" provision of the Civil
Aeronautics Act to hold an aircraft owner liable for the negli-
gence of the pilot.4 1 The courts had found a new toy to play
with. It did not seem to matter that for fifteen years no one
looked to the Act of 1938, or to the state statutes which it
spawned, as a guide to the issue of aircraft owner liability. No
one seemed to reason that if Congress intended to institute
vicarious liability for aircraft owners on a nationwide scale in
1938, it might have indicated its displeasure at having that
intention go ignored for so long long before 1953. Instead, fu-
ture courts built on the holdings of Hoebee, Hays and
Snodgrass, rather than coming to terms with the inherent
vagueness in the federal and state "operation of aircraft" pro-
visions, and the questions which should have been raised by
Congress' fifteen year silence. In some cases, 42 they even ex-
tended those decisions.
Certain courts began to apply the aviation code of foreign
states when dictated by "choice of law" rules.43 Even in cases
of first impression, the courts interpreted the "operation of
aircraft" provisions of these foreign codes as imposing vicari-
ous liability." In Ross v. Apple," which involved an air crash
near Cincinnati, Ohio, an Indiana court applying Ohio law
looked to Ohio's aviation statute which mirrored the federal
Act. It concluded that the language clearly imposed vicarious
liability on the owners of the aircraft for the negligence of its
38 221 F.2d at 482-83.
', 248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W.2d 622 (1957).
40 IOWA CODE ANN. § 328.1(14) (West 1946).
4, 85 N.W.2d at 3-26.
11 See notes 45-59 infra.
43 "Choice of Law" rules are the means by which each state determines whether its
own local law or the local law of another state shall be applied by it to determine the
rights and liabilities of the parties resulting from an occurrence involving foreign ele-
ments. These laws are referred to as choice of law rules because they do not them-
selves determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, but rather guide decisions as
to which local law rule will be applied to determine these rights and duties.
44 Ross v. Apple, 143 Ind. App. 357, 240 N.E.2d 825 (1968); Heidemann v. Rohl, 86
S.D. 250, 194 N.W.2d 164 (1972).
45 143 Ind. App. 357, 240 N.E.2d 825 (1968).
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pilots, thus reversing a trial court decision striking the plain-
tiff's allegation of vicarious liability against the aircraft
owner.
4
In Allegheny Airlines v. United States,7 a case involving a
mid-air collision between a small plane and an airliner, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 1974 decision, imposed
vicarious liability on the owner of the small aircraft for the
negligence of that aircraft's pilot."' The court justified the im-
position of vicarious liability by looking to the Indiana Stat-
ute's "operation of aircraft" provision' 9 which is a word for
word copy of the provision of the Civil Aeronautics Act. The
court acknowledged that the state courts in Indiana had not
yet had occasion to rule on the interpretation of their "opera-
tion of aircraft" provision, but it relied on Hoebee, Hays and
Snodgrass to argue that, if given the occasion, the Indiana
courts would interpret the provision as imposing vicarious lia-
bility on aircraft owners for the negligence of the pilot.50
In Heidemann v. Rohl,"' a case involving the crash in Ne-
braska of a light aircraft which was transporting the Augus-
tana College debate team from South Dakota to a tournament
in Colorado, the South Dakota Supreme Court, imposed vica-
rious liability on the owner of the aircraft.52 The Court ap-
plied the Nebraska aviation code which mirrored the federal
Act, and which had not yet been interpreted by a Nebraska
court. The Heidemann court stated: "Although the Supreme
Court of Nebraska has not yet been called upon to interpret
or apply Section 3-101(11) of their law, we may assume for the
purpose of this action that it would follow the decisions of
Iowa, New Hampshire and Mississippi.""3
Perhaps the most over-reaching decision imposing vicarious
46 Id.
' 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
4$ Id..
4, IND. CODE ANN. § 14-901(h) (Burns 1973), recodified as IND. CODE ANN. § 8-21-3-
1 (Burns 1980).
60 504 F.2d at 114.
" 86 S.D. 250, 194 N.W.2d 164 (1972).
, 194 N.W.2d at 167.
83 Id.
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liability which looked to the Civil Aeronautics Act and its suc-
cessor, the Federal Aviation Act, for its justification, was
made by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas in Sosa v. Young Flying Service." There,
the defendant/FBO had leased a plane to a student pilot, who
theri flew to Hebbronville, Texas, picked up three passengers,
and crashed near Laredo, Texas. All aspects of the flight had
occurred within the State of Texas.5 5 The Texas state legisla-
ture, in 1961, had repealed that section of its aviation statute
which had arguably imposed vicarious liability on aircraft
owners for the negligence of pilots.56 In spite of the fact that
the Texas state legislature had indicated its displeasure with
vicarious liability by virtue of the 1961 repeal, the court in
Sosa found the definitional "operation of aircraft" provision
in the Federal Aviation Act 57 to be so compelling, it justified
its imposition of vicarious liability on the aircraft owner solely
on the basis of the federal Act.58
If the analysis in the Sosa decision were to be followed by
all courts, vicarious liability would exist on a national basis for
all aircraft owners. Sosa looked beyond state law and con-
cluded that the Federal Aviation Act warranted the imposi-
tion of vicarious liability. Since the Federal Aviation Act ap-
plies equally to all aircraft owners, regardless of state
boundaries, the implications of that decision are clear. If Sosa
were to be strictly followed by future courts, it would result in
the federal pre-emption of all state laws which pertain to the
liability of aircraft owners.5'
277 F. Supp. 554 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
86 Id. at 555.
" Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 46-c (Vernon 1945) (repealed 1961).
- 49 U.S.C. § 1301(26) (1976).
Sosa v. Young Flying Service, 277 F. Supp. 554, 557 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
59 For an interesting article on the doctrine of federal preemption in the area of
aviation law, see Conklin, Doubt in the Courthouse: Is the Federal Law Supreme or
Not? 44 INS. COUNCIL J. 265 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Conklin]. Generally, Con-
gress must intend to occupy a given subject matter and there must be a showing by
clear evidence that the state law is repugnant to the federal law before the presump-
tion of the validity of the state law can be overcome. Id.
1981]
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B. State Liability Statutes Conflicting With Federal
"Operation of Aircraft" Provision
Following the pattern of applying inconsistent liability stan-
dards to aircraft owners established in this country in the
early part of this century, a number of courts, subsequent to
the Hoebee, Hays and Snodgrass decisions, looked closer at
the Federal Aviation Act and came to different conclusions re-
garding its intent. In Haskins v. Northeast Airways, Inc.,60 an
injured passenger asked the court to impose vicarious liability
on the owner of an aircraft for the negligence of the pilot. The
court determined that there was no agency relationship be-
tween the pilot and the owner;61 that there was no defect in
the plane of which the owner should have had knowledge; 2
and that the aircraft had not been used by a person whom the
owner should have known to be reckless. 3 If any liability was
to be imposed on the owner, the court reasoned that it would
have to be vicarious liability for the pilot's negligence."
. The court acknowledged that Minnesota had adopted a
state aviation code with an "operation of aircraft" provision
similar to the Federal Aviation Act's provision." The court
also acknowledged that New Hampshire, Mississippi and Iowa
had interpreted their own similar state statutes as imposing
vicarious liability on the owners of aircraft for pilot negli-
gence."6 Minnesota, however, had a second statute which
stated, in effect, that aircraft owners would be vicariously lia-
ble for injuries to people on the ground, and that liability for
injuries to passengers would be determined by the rules of law
applicable to torts occurring on the land.67
Minnesota law, therefore, was in an apparent conflict. One
statute stated that owner liability for passengers should be de-
termined by the law applicable to torts occurring on the land,
266 Minn. 210, 123 N.W.2d 81 (1963).




"6 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 360.013(10) (West 1966).
" 123 N.W.2d at 84-85.
7 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 360.012(5) (West 1966).
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which in Minnesota required looking to the common law of
bailment which did not impose vicarious liability. 3 The sec-
ond statute had been interpreted by three other states as im-
posing vicarious liability on owners. Additionally, the Federal
Aviation Act, applicable to all owners of aircraft, could have
been interpreted by the court, as it later was in Sosa,'9 to ap-
ply regardless of the state law scheme. Nevertheless, the Min-
nesota court in. Haskins looked to the statute which advised
that the law applicable to torts occurring on land be followed
in instances of aircraft passenger injury and resolved the con-
flict in favor of the owner.
In Haskins, the court found in favor of the owner in spite of
the existence of the Federal Aviation Act's "operation of air-
craft" provision. The plaintiff, however, had not urged the
court to follow the Federal Aviation Act. He relied instead on
a state statute which was in conflict with another state stat-
ute. Thus, the Haskins court was not compelled to interpret
the effect of the Federal Aviation Act if it was, in fact, in con-
flict with state law.
The first court to come to grips with the issue of federal
preemption was the court in Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying
Service, Inc.7 In Rogers, a pilot rented an aircraft from the
defendant/FBO and, as a result of his own negligence, crashed
killing his wife and his wife's sister, both passengers on
board.72 The parents of the wife and sister filed suit against
the FBO on the basis of the Federal Aviation Act's "operation
of aircraft" provision, seeking to impose vicarious liability on
the fixed base operator for the pilot's negligence.7 3 The Fed-
eral District Court in Oklahoma denied t!e defendant/FBO's
6' Szyca v. Northern Light Lodge No. 121, 199 Minn. 99, 271 N.W. 102 (1937);
Cornish v. Kreuer, 179 Minn. 60, 228 N.W. 445 (1929); Mogle v. A.W. Scott Co., 144
Minn. 173, 174 N.W. 832 (1919)(all held that in the absence of a statute, a bailor is
not liable for the negligence of his bailee in Minnesota).
69 Sosa v. Young Flying Service, 277 F. Supp. 554 (S.D. Tex. 1967). See text accom-
panying note 54 supra.
'0 Haskins v. Northeast Airways, Inc., 266 Minn. 210, 123 N.W.2d 81 (1963). See
text accompanying note 64 supra.
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motion for summary judgment and the defendant appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.74
The Court of Appeals held that the federal statute did not
preempt the provisions of state bailment law.7 1 It found fur-
ther that in 1938, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had specifi-
cally held that the negligence of the bailee/lessee of an air-
plane may not be imputed to the bailor.7 ' Thus, in the case
before it, the Court of Appeals held that the negligence of a
non-agent operator/lessee may not be imputed to the opera-
tor/lessor of an airplane for hire.
In Nachsin v. De La Bretonne," involving an air crash that
occurred prior to the adoption of the California Public Utility
Code section which imposes limited vicarious liability on the
owners of aircraft, va the court looked to the California law in
effect at the time of the accident, rather than the Federal Avi-
ation Act, as urged by plaintiff, to determine the owner's lia-
bility.7 9 The applicable California law in effect in 1966 stated
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1392-95.
11 Id. at 1391. See Spartan Aircraft Co. v. Jamison, 181 Okla. 645, 75 P.2d 1096
(1938), where the bailee/lessee used the plane to tow an electric advertising sign at
night. Apparently due to the more powerful battery installed to light the sign, the
navigation lights set the plane on fire. The decedent rushed from a hangar with a fire
extinguisher and was killed when struck by the spinning propeller.
17 Cal. App. 3d 637, 95 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1971).
78 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21404.1 (West Supp. 1981).
Limitation on Liability
(a) The liability of an owner, bailee of an owner, or personal repre-
sentative of a decedent imposed by Section 21404 and not arising
through the relationship of principal and agent or master and servant
is limited to the amount of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) for the
death of or injury to one person in any one accident and, subject to the
limit as to one person, is limited to the amount of thirty thousand
dollars ($30,000) for the death of or injury to more than one person in
any one accident and is limited to the amount of five thousand dollars
($5,000) for damage to property of others in any one accident.
(b) An owner, bailee of an owner, or personal representative of a
decedent is not liable under this section for damages imposed for the
sake of example and by way of punishing the operator of the aircraft.
Nothing in this subdivision makes an owner, bailee of an owner, or
personal representative immune from liability for damages imposed
for the sake of example and by way of punishing him for his own
wrongful conduct.
Id.
71 17 Cal. App. 3d at 639, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
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that aviation tort liability should be determined by the rules
of law applicable to torts occurring on land or water.80 Look-
ing to the California common law of torts, the court deter-
mined that negligence of the pilot alone, absent the indepen-
dent negligence of the owner or an agency relationship
between the owner and the pilot, was not imputable to the
owner.
81
C. Interpreting the Federal "Operation of Aircraft"
Provision as Definitional
Many courts, even when they were not faced with a conflict-
ing state statute regarding aircraft owner liability, began to
ignore the Federal Aviation Act as a source of civil liability in
their decision making processes.82 In Rosdail v. Western Avia-
tion, Inc.,88 decided two years after Sosa, the Federal District
Court sitting in Colorado held that the "operation of aircraft"
provision of the Federal Aviation Act was not meant to pro-
vide a civil remedy to the victim of an aviation accident." In
Rosdail, the plaintiff rented an aircraft from the defendant
and hired a pilot to fly him and others to Illinois and Iowa
from Colorado. The crash occurred in Iowa." During trial, the
plaintiff argued that the "operation of aircraft" provision of
the Federal Aviation Act required the imposition of vicarious
liability on the defendant/FBO and the defendant/owner for
the pilot's negligence.86 There was a pending question before
the court whether Iowa or Colorado law was to apply to the
facts of the case,8 7 The court, however, restricted its decision
to the plaintiff's allegation that the pilot's negligence could be
imputed to the owner and lessor pursuant to the Federal Avi-
ation Act.8
:0 California Aeronautics Act, CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21404 (West Supp. 1981).
17 Cal. App. 3d at 639, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
8 See notes 83-104 infra and accompanying text.
83 297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969).
Id. at 687.
88 Id. at 682.
6 Id. at 683.
:7 Id. at 682.
8 Id. at 682-83.
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Unfortunately for the plainiff in Rosdail, the court did not
view the Federal Aviation Act in quite the same manner as
the Sosa court. Acknowledging, but then choosing not to fol-
low Sosa, the court took the position that the Federal Avia-
tion Act was never meant to provide a civil remedy to acci-
dent victims.8 9 The court interpreted the "operation of
aircraft" provision of the Act as being a strictly definitional
provision. The court explained that state law dominates the
law of tort, and that in the absence of compelling reasons for
uniformity, inadequate state remedies, or national interest,
there is no justification for implying a civil remedy from the
Federal regulations. 1
In McCord v. Dixie Aviation Corp.,92 in which the plaintiff
alleged vicarious liability against the defendant/aircraft owner
for the pilot's negligence based upon the Federal Aviation Act,
the court rejected plaintiff's argument, stating that the Act
did not apply and that Congress never intended to provide a
civil remedy as a result of the enactment of its "operation of
aircraft" provision. The court in McCord did not even speak
to the issue of federal pre-emption of state law.9' Its holding
stands for the proposition that the Federal Aviation Act
should not be looked to as a civil remedy regardless of
whether there is or is not a conflicting state law.
In Sanz v. Renton Aviation, Inc., 6 a federal court of ap-
peals again refused to apply the Federal Aviation Act as a
civil remedy where the plaintiff urged the imposition of vicari-
ous liability on the aircraft owner for the negligence of the
pilot. There, the court held that the purpose of the "opera-
tion of aircraft" provision was to subject owners equally with
pilots to the rules, regulations and penalties of the Act. 6 The




" 450 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1131.
See Conklin, supra -note 59 for discussion of federal preemption.
" 511 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1029.
LIABILITY OF FIXED BASE OPERATORS
pose vicarious liability on aircraft owners for pilot negligence,
it could have stated that concept far clearer than the language
contained in the "operation of aircraft" provision."
Perhaps the case whose reasoning has most minimized the
importance of the Federal Aviation Act as a source of vicari-
ous liability for aircraft owners is Lockwood v. Astronautics
Flying Club, Inc.98 In Lockwood, the widow of a deceased pas-
senger brought suit against the aircraft owner alleging vicari-
ous liability for the pilot's negligence. 99 Although the action
was filed in Florida, the accident occurred over the "high
seas." The court acknowledged that Florida state law imposed
vicarious liability on aircraft owners,100 but reasoned that fed-
eral law should apply due to the accident site.' 1
In cases prior to Lockwood,'0 2 which rejected the Federal
Aviation Act as a civil remedy for accident victims, one com-
mon theme running throughout those decisions was the con-
cept that tort law should remain in the dominion of the state.
In Lockwood, however, the court was compelled to ignore
state law because the accident site demanded the application
of federal law. 03 If ever invocation of the "operation of air-
craft" provision in the Federal Aviation Act to impose vicari-
ous liability was likely, it would have seemed so in a case such
9
7 Id.
98 437 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1971).
"Id.
100 Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970), where appellee was the co-owner of
an airplane. The plane crashed as a result of the negligent piloting by the other co-
owner, killing the pilot and his son. The court held that no damages were recoverable
by the spouse of the negligent pilot for the wrongful death of her child caused by the
negligence of her husband possessing proper custody of the child. The administratrix
of the child's estate did have a cause of action against the co-owner because vicarious
liability grows out of the ownership of the airplane.
101 437 F.2d at 438.
1 In Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service, Inc., 435 F.2d 1389, 1394 (5th Cir.
1970), the court emphasized that "tort law has historically been left to the states." In
Nachsin v. De La Bretonne, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (1971), the
court concluded that "tort law has historically been left to the states." In Rosdail v.
Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681, 683 (D. Colo. 1969), the court stated that
"state law predominated the law of torts."
108 The aircraft accident which was the subject of Lockwood occurred at sea. The
lawsuit was brought in admiralty and the court held that federal maritime law was
applicable. 437 F.2d at 438.
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as Lockwood, where the court was compelled to apply federal
law, and where the state law for that jurisdiction would have
imposed vicarious liability if it were applicable. Nevertheless,
the court in Lockwood rejected the Federal Aviation Act and
refused to impose vicarious liability on the aircraft owner,
stating:
We think Rogers made it clear that the Federal Aviation Act
was intended only to subject owners equally with pilots to the
rules, regulations, and penalties provided in the Federal Avia-
tion Act. The Act was not envisaged as creating a basis for a
cause of action against owners of aircraft for wrongful death.1
The Lockwood decision probably raised more questions
than it answered. If the Federal Aviation Act was not meant
to provide a civil remedy to air crash victims, even when a
case demanded the application of federal law, then what could
be said about the effect on owner liability of the multitude of
state aviation codes which had adopted the identical language
of the federal Act? Were those codes also to be viewed as reg-
ulatory only, and not as a source of civil remedies?
D. Interpreting the State "Operation of Aircraft"
Provisions as Definitional
States which have been forced to interpret their own state
statutes in light of Lockwood have not been given clear direc-
tion. Allegheny Airlines'" and Heidemann'06 are examples of
decisions occurring subsequent to Lockwood, which interpret
state aviation codes identical to the federal Act as imposing
vicarious liability. Other courts have taken a different ap-
proach, looking to the legislative intent of the state code and
the ambiguous language contained therein to ignore vicarious
liability.1 0 7 In Broadway v. Webb,10 8 renter pilot negligence
'0' Id. at 439.
105 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
- 86 S.D. 250, 194 N.W.2d 164 (1972).
101 Broadway v. Webb, 462 F. Supp. 429 (W.D.N.C. 1977); Ferrari v. Byerly Avia-
tion, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 2d 747, 268 N.E.2d 558 (1971); Haker v. Southwestern Ry. Co.,
176 Mont. 364, 578 P.2d 724 (1978).
1" 462 F. Supp. 429 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
LIABILITY OF FIXED BASE OPERATORS
was responsible for causing a crash. Plaintiff alleged vicarious
liability against the aircraft owner based on the North Caro-
lina statute which mirrored the "operation of aircraft" provi-
sion of the Federal Aviation Act.169 The court looked to the
clarity of the language in the North Carolina statute, which
imposed vicarious liability for automobile owners, 1 0 to con-
clude that the legislature would have utilized more decisive
language in its aviation statute than that contained in its "op-
eration of aircraft" provision if it had intended to impose vi-
carious liability on aircraft owners for the negligence of pi-
lots."' The decision was thus resolved in favor of the
owner.
112
In Ferrari v. Byerly Aviation, Inc.,1" plaintiff, the estate of
a passenger killed in a plane crash, alleged vicarious liability
against the owner of the plane for the pilot's negligence. The
court looked to the Illinois aviation code which had an "oper-
ation of aircraft" provision" 4 identical to the Federal Aviation
Act, and reasoned that the Illinois legislature did not intend
to affect the civil liability of aircraft owners when passing the
statute." 6
In Haker v. Southwestern Ry. Co.,'" where the Montana
"operation of aircraft" provision"7 was practically identical to
the Federal Aviation Act's,1 8 the court looked to the fact that
there was no intent on the part of the Montana legislature to
impute pilot negligence to owners and lessors in order to deny
the imposition of vicarious liability."" The court also pointed
out that the language in the Montana statute was not nearly
:09 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-1(16) (1981).
110 Id. § 20-71.1 (1978).
" 462 F. Supp. at 433.
112 Id.
110 131 Ill. App. 2d 747, 268 N.E.2d 558 (1971).
14 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 15 1/2, § 22.11 (1973).
:11 268 N.E.2d at 561.
11 176 Mont. 364, 578 P.2d 724 (1978).
117 MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 1-102(11) (1947), recodified at MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 67-1-101(29) (1979).
118 The Montana statute defined "operation of aircraft" to include "the navigation
or piloting of aircraft." Id. (emphasis added). The Federal Aviation Act limited its
definition to "the navigation of aircraft." See text accompanying note 57 supra.
"o 578 P.2d at 726.
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as clear as the language in other state statutes120 which deci-
sively imposed vicarious liability on aircraft owners and that
had the Montana legislature meant to impose vicarious liabil-
ity, it could have done so with more clarity and not within the
confines of a definitional provision."'
IV. STATE STATUTES WHICH DIVERGE FROM THE FEDERAL
ACT LANGUAGE
As has been seen in the review of decisions interpreting the
Federal Aviation Act and the state laws which copy it, identi-
cal statutory language can mean different things to different
courts. At least one case which was examined held that the
federal Act imposed vicarious liability on aircraft owners re-
gardless of state law."2' A second case which was reviewed
held the federal Act to be a definitional provision, not meant
to provide a civil remedy to accident victims. s2 One line of
cases held that the state codes mirrored after the federal Act
imposed vicarious liability on aircraft owners." 4 Another line
110 Id. at 728. The Haker court cited N.J. STAT. ANN. § 6:2-7 (West 1973) which
states:
Liability for injuries to person or property: lien on aircraft; mort-
gagees, vendors and trustees not deemed owners. The owner of every
aircraft which is operated over the land or waters of this State is abso-
lutely liable for injuries to persons or property on the land or water
beneath, caused by ascent, descent, or flight of the aircraft, or the
dropping or falling of any object therefrom, whether such owner was
negligent or not, unless the injury is caused in whole or in part by the
negligence of the person injured, or of the owner or bailee of the prop-
erty injured. If the aircraft is leased at the time of the injury to person
or property, both owner and lessee shall be liable, and they may be
sued jointly, or either or both of them may be sued separately. An
airman who is not the owner or lessee shall be liable only for the con-
sequences of his own negligence. The injured person, or owner or
bailee of the injured property, shall have a lien on the aircraft causing
the injury to the extent of the damage caused by the aircraft or object
falling from it. A chattel mortgagee, conditional vendor or trustee
under an equipment trust, of any aircraft, not in possession of such
aircraft, shall not be deemed an owner within the provisions of this
section.
Id,
111 578 P.2d at 728.
122 Sosa v. Young Flying Service, 277 F. Supp. 554 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
123 Lockwood v. Astronautics Flying Club, Inc., 437 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1971).
I" Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974); Hays v.
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of cases which were noted held that state codes identical to
the federal Act are definitional and do not impose vicarious
liability."2 5 This lack of consistency has predominated the
way in which the "operation of aircraft" provisions of the fed-
eral Act and the various state statutes have been interpreted.
Perhaps as a response to the lack of predictability which
would result from reliance on a state aviation statute identical
to the Federal Aviation Act, certain states utilize their own
statutory language to address the issue of aircraft owner lia-
bility.2 In some cases, these state codes do not go as far as
the Federal Aviation Act when interpreted as imposing vicari-
ous liability on the aircraft owners. In some cases, however,
they go further. 2
A. State Statutes Restricting Vicarious Liability
The state codes which apply a modified form of vicarious
liability limit the exposure to aircraft owners in various ways.
The California Public Utility Code 2 " makes the aircraft own-
er liable for pilot negligence, but limits the liable exposure to
$15,000.00 for one person; $30,000.00 for more than one per-
son; and $5,000.00 for property loss. 29 In Cummins v. Sky
Cruiser, Inc.,130 the passenger/decedent's wife filed a wrongful
death action against the FBO that rented the aircraft, alleging
vicarious liability for the pilot's negligence. The California
court refused to extend even this limited form of vicarious lia-
bility to the defendant rental facility because the defendant
did not own the subject aircraft.'' The court determined that
Morgan, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955); Ross v. Apple, 143 Ind. App. 357, 240 N.E.2d
825 (1968); Lamasters v. Snodgrass, 248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W. 2d 622 (1957); Hoebee v.
Howe, 98 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223 (1953).
" Broadway v. Webb, 462 F.2d 429 (W.D.N.C. 1977); Haker v. Southwestern Ry.
Co., 176 Mont. 364, 578 P.2d 724 (1978); Heidemann v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 194 N.W.2d
164 (1972); Ferrari v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 131 Ill. App. 2d 747, 268 N.E.2d 558
(1971).
'6 See appendix infra.
See appendix infra.
l CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21404 (West Supp. 1981).
l' CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21404.1 (West Supp. 1981).
Ito 59 Cal. App. 3d 983, 130 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1976).
s Id. at 987, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
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the FBO sold the plane just prior to the crash and that it
maintained it at the time of the accident on a leaseback agree-
ment with the new owner.13' The court held that the Califor-
nia Public Utility Code only imposed its limited form of vica-
rious liability on the true legal owner of the aircraft. "8
In Nastasi v. Hochman," the court held that the New
York aircraft owner vicarious liability statute' did not apply
to an accident occurring outside the State of New York.13 6 In
that case, the FBO was located in New York, the pilot and
passenger rented the aircraft in New York, but the crash took
place in Connecticut.1 8 7 In Heidemann, although the South
Dakota Supreme Court applied the aviation code of Nebraska,
it acknowledged the vicarious liability law of South Dakota
which limited aircraft owner vicarious liability to injuries oc-
curring to persons or property on the ground.188 The states
which have modified the application of vicarious liability to
aircraft owners have thus done so by limiting the dollar expo-
sure per victim;18 9 by applying liability only to the true legal
owner of the aircraft;140 and by limiting liability exposure to
injuries occurring to persons or property on the ground.1 4
B. State Statutes Expanding Vicarious Liability
A number of states have taken the opposite approach in
their non-Federal Aviation Act codes, and have extended the
vicarious liability of aircraft owners beyond any interpretation
of the federal Act. " ' In Florida, the courts have developed a
doctrine which declares that the owners of dangerous instru-
Id. at 985, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
Compare this interpretation of the California Public Utility Code to the inter-
pretation of the Federal Aviation Act and its state code progeny, which extends un-
limited vicarious liability to anyone who "authorizes" the operation or use of an air-
craft, regardless of their ownership interests.
3' 58 A.D.2d 564, 396 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1977).
188 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 251(1) (McKinney 1968).
131 396 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
137 Id.
186 S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 50-13-6, 50-13-7 (1967).
1,' See California, appendix, infra.
14. See California, appendix, infra.
I See appendix, infra.
148 See appendix, infra.
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mentalities will bear vicarious liability for the negligence of
any person operating said instrumentality. In Orefice v. Al-
bert,43 the Florida Supreme Court determined that an air-
plane was a dangerous instrumentality for the purpose of ap-
plying vicarious liability.14 4  As a result, under Florida law,
vicarious liability is imposed on the aircraft owner regardless
of whether the owner "authorizes" the use of the aircraft, as
long as some implied consent for its use can be found. ' 4 The
only way an aircraft owner can defeat the imposition of vicari-
ous liability for pilot error in Florida is to prove that the pilot
stole the airplane. 46
In Storie v. Southfield Leasing, Inc.,' the Court of Ap-
peals of Michigan had occasion to interpret the Michigan
state statute which imposes vicarious liability on aircraft own-
ers.14 8 The statute provides as follows:
The owner or operator or the person or organization responsi-
ble for the maintenance or use of an aircraft shall be liable for
any injury occasioned by the negligent operation of the air-
craft, whether the negligence consists of a violation of the pro-
visions of the statutes of the state, or in the failure to observe
ordinary care in the operation as the rules of the common law
require. '49
Storie involved an airplane crash which occurred due to pi-
lot error, killing the pilot and passenger. Plaintiff's decedent
alleged vicarious liability against the owner of the aircraft
which had leased it to the pilot's company almost five years
prior to the accident. Defendant exercised no control over the
1"3 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970).
"4, Id. at 143-44.
,45 Id. at 144-45.
146 Jensen v. Sel-Nar, Inc., No. 77-20740 (17th J. Dist., Broward County, Fla., May,
1979). This author was involved in a jury trial on behalf of the fixed base operator
before a Florida state court in which the only defense to the action was that the
accident victim had taken the aircraft without the implied consent of the fixed base
operator. It was therefore necessary to prove that the victim had stolen the aircraft.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the fixed base operator.
147 90 Mich. App. 612, 282 N.W.2d 417 (1979).
148 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 259.180a(1) (1977).
149 Id.
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aircraft at the time of the accident. 150 The court acknowl-
edged Section 1404 of the Federal Aviation Act' 1' which ex-
empts from liability -lessors of aircraft subject to a lease of 30
days or more. 52 The court determined, however, that the
Michigan state code, which extends vicarious liability beyond
the Federal Aviation Act to "the owners or operators or the
person or organization responsible for the maintenance . ..
of an aircraft1' 53 [emphasis added] regardless of the control
or authority that they maintain over aircraft use and opera-
tion, should prevail.14 The court emphasized that the purpose
of the Michigan statute was to encourage increased supervi-
sion over maintenance of aircraft. 10
The reasoning in the Storie decision and the Michigan avia-
tion statute which it relies upon make little sense. Imposing
vicarious liability for pilot error on a lessor who has given up
possession of the aircraft five years prior to the crash will not
encourage increased supervision over maintenance, nor will
improved maintenance be fostered by imposing vicarious lia-
bility on a repair facility which exercises no control over the
persons operating the aircraft. Pilot error can be responsible
for an aircraft accident even when the plane is in excellent
condition, and placing blame on absentee lessors and mainte-
nance facilities in the interests of better maintenance is mis-
placed in those instances. Common tort law imposes a duty of
reasonableness which requires that airplanes be maintained in
an airworthy condition.16 Reasonableness is the standard
which will encourage supervision over maintenance, not vica-
rious liability for pilot error. Imposing vicarious liability for
pilot error in the interests of improved maintenance is a clear
example of the over-reaching which some state legislatures
and courts have done in their confusion over the proper liabil-
15 282 N.W.2d at 418.
151 Id. at 420.
... 49 U.S.C. § 1404 (Supp. 1981).
1"3 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 259.180a(1) (1977).
,6 282 N.W.2d at 421.
,' Id. at 419.
" See also, Federal Air Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 43 (1980), which sets out require-
ments for aircraft maintenance.
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ity standard that should be applied to the owners and lessors
of aircraft.
Although the Storie decision uses unsound reasoning to ex-
tend vicarious liability in Michigan far beyond even the most
liberal interpretation of the Federal Aviation Act and its state
code progeny, one state court, in its interpretation of its own
state aviation code, has gone even further. In Ewers v. Thun-
derbird Aviation, Inc.,157 the Minnesota Supreme Court had
occasion to interpret the Minnesota vicarious liability stat-
ute1" which had been enacted in 1976 in a delayed response
to the Haskins v. Northeast Airways, Inc., decision rendered
13 years earlier. Haskins resolved two conflicting state liabil-
ity statutes in favor of the aircraft owner on the issue of vica-
rious liability. The 1976 Minnesota statute provides as
follows:
When an aircraft is operated within the airspace above the
state or upon the ground surface or waters of this state by a
person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner,
expressed or implied, the operator shall in case of accident be
deemed the agent of the owner of the aircraft in its
operation.15 '
In Ewers, an aircraft which had been purchased from the
defendant and then leased back to it was rented by the defen-
dant to a pilot and passenger in Minnesota. The plane took
off in Minnesota, but crashed on approach to a Denver, Colo-
rado airport. The passenger's widow filed suit against the
FBO alleging vicarious liability for the pilot's negligence.'16
Colorado law did not impose vicarious liability on the aircraft
owner, but plaintiff urged the application of the Minnesota
statute, even though the accident took place in Colorado. The
Minnesota Supreme Court accepted plaintiff's reasoning and
imposed vicarious liability on the defendant.1 61 The court in-
terpreted Minnesota's statute as applying to aircraft acci-
289 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. 1979).
' MINN. STAT. ANN. § 360.0216 (West Supp. 1981).
159 Id.
o 289 N.W. 2d at 96.
101 Id. at 97.
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dents, regardless of where they occur, as long as the aircraft is
operated within the State of Minnesota during any part of the
flight. 162
The dissenting opinion in Ewers correctly points out the
dangerous implications of the majority opinion.1"' It explains
that as a result of the court's decision, any flight which
crosses Minnesota airspace, however briefly, will be subject to
the Minnesota statute, even where the flight originates and
crashes in a state other than Minnesota.16 4 Thus, victims of
the crash in Montana of a flight bound from Chicago to Seat-
tle, which passed over the State of Minnesota, could rely on
the reasoning in Ewers to impose the Minnesota vicarious lia-
bility law on the aircraft owner.
V. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS
It should be clear that the Federal Aviation Act and its
state code progeny are not the only codes pertaining to air-
craft owner and lessor liability which create confusion.' 65
Many of the state statutes which depart from the language of
the federal Act have also resulted in inconsistent and unpre-
dictable court rulings. The only conclusion that can be safely
reached on the subject of FBO liability is that, until the pas-
sage of a uniform federal act to the contrary, all FBO's, their
insurers and lawyers should be aware of the possible applica-
tion of vicarious liability and thus respond to the question of
accident risk as if vicarious liability for pilot negligence were
the applicable standard of care. As long as decisions such as
Ewers exist, it is possible that vicarious liability will be im-
posed regardless of the FBO's place of doing business or the
accident site.
Responding to the needs of risk minimization should re-
quire the FBO to make a greater than "reasonable" effort in
determining the qualifications of all rental pilots. Once the
"' Id. at 98.
'' Id. at 100-01 (Otis, J., dissenting).
184 Id.
"' See discussion at notes 128-64 supra, regarding the state aviation codes of Cali-
fornia, New York, Florida, Michigan and Minnesota.
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FBO is made to understand that he is likely to share equally
in the liability incurred by a negligent pilot, perhaps his
rental standards will increase. Additionally, the FBO should
respond to every accidIent involving any of his aircraft as if he
will be the one held to blame. This requires a gathering of all
pertinent information immediately after notice of an accident
is received, so that an eventual defense which might prove
necessary if vicarious liability is imposed is not prejudiced by
delay. The FBO should also contact his insurance company
regarding all accidents involving his aircraft, as well as any
other person or organization he feels may be of assistance in
conducting a proper and thorough investigation on his behalf.
For the insurance company, the exposure created by a vica-
rious liability holding against the FBO is the same as that
which exists when the company provides coverage for the
renter pilot. In view of the unpredictable status of vicarious
liability, the insurance company which insures the FBO
should therefore charge a premium equal to that which it
charges when a renter pilot endorsement 6' of equal limits is
included in the FBO's policy. The insurance company should
also take all necessary steps to investigate accidents involving
aircraft owned by its insured FBO as soon as notice of the
accident is received. In the event that vicarious liability is ap-
plied to the FBO, the insurance company will not want to be
in the position of having to commence its investigation well
after the accident has occurred.
Lawyers who represent FBO's and their insurers should be
familiar with every state's vicarious liability law which might
arguably be applied to the facts of a particular accident. 167
This would include particularly the state where the flight
originated and the state where the accident occurred, but
might also include any other state which has a significant con-
'" A renter pilot endorsement is a common clause in an aviation insurance policy
whereby the insurance company; on an owner's or FBO's policy, also agrees to defend
and indemnify the renter pilot for liability incurred up to a stated policy limit. Typi-
cally, the owner or FBO will pay a higher premium for a policy which includes a
renter pilot endorsement, and he will utilize the existence of this coverage as an
added selling point in promoting the rental of his aircraft to potential renter pilots.
"6, See appendix, infra.
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tact with the accident or its victims. In the event that the
state whose law is applied maintains an aviation code identi-
cal to the Federal Aviation Act, arguments can be made re-.
garding the true intent of the statute 'hot to impose a civil
remedy for aircraft victims.16 In the event that a state statute
which diverges from the federal Act language is applied, the
state law should be examined carefully and analytically so
that the absurdities of a broad reading can be utilized to nar-
row the court's interpretation of its intended effect.
Perhaps the best solution to the problems which result from
the unpredictable status of aircraft owner liability would be
the Congressional enactment of a statute designating a clear
liability standard, applicable nationwide to all aircraft owners.
To this day, there is not a court in the country which appears
to know with certainty whether that was the intent of Con-
gress in 1938, when it passed the Civil Aeronautics Act. Until,
and unless, such a uniform federal guideline is adopted, how-
ever, FBO's, their insurers and lawyers, must be prepared to
react quickly and to investigate thoroughly all accidents in-
volving aircraft owned or leased by FBO's, regardless of the
apparent cause of the crash. This type of response is the best
guarantee available for minimizing the adverse consequences
of the unpredictability still inherent in our present vicarious
liability laws.
" Recently the Supreme Court has been faced with the issue of whether a federal
statute gives rise to a civil remedy available to private litigants and has taken a very
restrictive approach. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), the
Court, in reversing and remanding the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, held that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 17(a) (as amended
by 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1975)) did not create an implied private cause of action for
damages in favor of a broker-dealer's customers against the accounting firm which
allegedly conducted an improper audit and certification of the broker-dealer's
financial statement. The court stated that the violation of a federal statute which
results in injury or damages does not automatically give rise to a private cause of
action in favor of the person injured. Further, it stated that where plain language of
the statute weighs against the implication of a private remedy, the fact that the legis-
lative history provides no suggestion or evidence that the statute was to give rise to a
suit for damages reinforces the court's decision not to find such a right of action
implicit in the statute. Accord, Kissinger v. Reporters Committee, - U.S. -, 100
S.Ct. 960 (1980)(Federal Records Act of 1950, 44 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-2910 (1969)),
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (Investment Advi-
sors Act of 1940, § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976)).
LIABILITY OF FIXED BASE OPERATORS
APPENDIX
ADOPTED CAA STATE STATUTE
"OPERATION OF INTERPRETED AS VARIATIONS IN THE
AIRCRAFT" IMPOSING VICARIOUS APPLICATION OF
PROVISION LANGUAGE LIABILITY ON OWNER VICARIOUS LIABILITY
IN STATE OF AIRCRAFT FOR ON OWNER OF
STATE AERONAUTICS CODE PILOT NEGLIGENCE AIRCRAFT
Alaska No No N/A
Alabama No No N/A
Arizona No No N/A
Arkansas No No N/A






injury of one person
in any one accident;
$30,000 for death or
injury to more than
one person in any
one accident; and
$5,000 for property
damage in any one
accident
Colorado No No N/A
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ADOPTED CAA STATE STATUTE
"OPERATION OF INTERPRETED AS VARIATIONS IN THE
AIRCRAFT" IMPOSING VICARIOUS APPLICATION OF
PROVISION LANGUAGE LIABILITY ON OWNER VICARIOUS LIABILITY
IN STATE OF AIRCRAFT FOR ON OWNER OF
STATE AERONAUTICS CODE PILOT NEGLIGENCE AIRCRAFT
Delaware Yes. DEL. CODE Yes Strict liability
ANN. tit. 2 § 501 imposed on owner
(1974) for all personal
injuries arising out
of the operation of
aircraft. Handy v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 327
F. Supp. 596 (D.
Del. 1971)











226 So.2d 15 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
Georgia No No N/A
Hawaii No State statute HAWAII REV. STAT. §
imposes restricted 263-5 (1976). Owner
vicarious liability of aircraft is only
but has not been vicariously liable for
interpreted, injury or damage to
persons or property
on land or water in
the state.
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ADOPTED CAA STATE STATUTE
"OPERATION OF INTERPRETED AS VARIATIONS IN THE
AIRCRAFT" IMPOSING VICARIOUS APPLICATION OF
PROVISION LANGUAGE LIABILITY ON OWNER VICARIOUS LIABILITY
IN STATE OF AIRCRAFT FOR ON OWNER OF
STATE AERONAUTICS CODE PILOT NEGLIGENCE AIRCRAFT
Idaho No No N/A
Illinois Yes. ILL. ANN. STAT. No. Ferrari v. N/A
ch. 15 1/2, § 22.11 Byerly Aviation,
(Smith-Hurd 1963) Inc., 268 N.E.2d 558
(Ill. App. Ct. 1971)
Indiana Yes. IND. CODE ANN. Yes Only interpretation
§ 8-21-1(k) (Burns made by federal,
1980) not state court.
Kohr v. Allegheny
Airlines, Inc., 586
F.2d 53 (7th Cir.
1978).
Iowa Yes. IOWA CODE Yes. Lamasters v. N/A
ANN. § 328.1(14) Snodgrass, 85
(West 1949) N.W.2d 622 (Iowa
1957).
Kansas No No N/A
Kentucky Yes. Ky. REV. STAT. No interpretation N/A
§ 183.011(16) (1980)
Louisiana No No N/A
Maine Yes. ME. REV. STAT. No interpretation N/A
ANN. tit. 6, § 3(24)
(1964).
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ADOPTED CAA STATE STATUTE
"OPERATION OF INTERPRETED AS VARIATIONS IN THE
AIRCRAFT" IMPOSING VICARIOUS APPLICATION OF
PROVISION LANGUAGE LIABILITY ON OWNER VICARIOUS LIABILITY
IN STATE OF AIRCRAFT FOR ON OWNER OF
STATE AERONAUTICS CODE PILOT NEGLIGENCE AIRCRAFT
Maryland No MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 5-1005(a)
(1977). State statute imposes a rebuttable
presumption of vicarious liability on the
owner or lessee for the pilot's negligence
for injury or damage to persons or
property on ground or water of state.
Vicarious liability rebuttable by proof that
owner or lessee were free from negligence.
Statute not interpreted.
Massachusetts Yes. MASS. ANN. No interpretation N/A
LAWS ch. 90, § 35(j)
(Michie/Law. Co-op)
Michigan Yes. MICH. COMP. Yes (Expanded and (a) EXPANDED -
LAWS ANN. § 259.22 Restricted) Storie v. vicarious liability
(1977) Southfield Leasing statute includes
Inc., 90 Mich. App. person or
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ADOPTED CAA STATE STATUTE
"OPERATION OF INTERPRETED AS VARIATIONS IN THE
AIRCRAFT" IMPOSING VICARIOUS APPLICATION OF
PROVISION LANGUAGE LIABILITY ON OWNER VICARIOUS LIABILITY
IN STATE OF AIRCRAFT FOR ON OWNER OF
STATE AERONAUTICS CODE PILOT NEGLIGENCE AIRCRAFT
Minnesota Yes. MINN. STAT. Yes (Expanded) State vicarious
ANN. § 360.013(10) Ewers v. liability statute
(West 1966) Thunderbird applied whenever
Aviation, Inc., 289 any part of flight
N.W.2d 94 (Minn. occurs over
1979) Minnesota airspace.






Mississippi Yes. MISS. CODE Yes. Hays v. N/A
ANN. § 61-1-3(1) Morgan, 221 F.2d
(1972) 481 (5th Cir. 1955).
Missouri No No N/A
Montana Yes. MONT. REV. No. Haker v. N/A
CODES ANN. § 67-1- Southwestern Ry.
101(29) (1979) Co., 578 P.2d 724
(Mont. 1978)
Nebraska Yes. NEB. REV. In Heideman v. N/A
STAT. § 3-101(11) Rohl, 194 N.W.2d
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ADOPTED CAA STATE STATUTE
"OPERATION OF INTERPRETED AS VARIATIONS IN THE
AIRCRAFT" IMPOSING VICARIOUS APPLICATION OF
PROVISION LANGUAGE LIABILITY ON OWNER VICARIOUS LIABILITY
IN STATE OF AIRCRAFT FOR ON OWNER OF
STATE AERONAUTICS CODE PILOT NEGLIGENCE AIRCRAFT
Nevada No NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.060 (1979). State
statute imposes a rebuttable presumption
of vicarious liability on the owner or lessee
for the pilot's negligence for injury or
damage to persons or property on the
ground or water of the state. Vicarious
liability rebuttable by proof that owner or
lessee was free from negligence.
New Hampshire Yes. N.H. REV. Yes. Hoebee v. But see: N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 422:3 Howe, 97 A.2d 223 STAT. ANN. § 422:35-













of such aircraft at
time of injury or
damage.
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ADOPTED CAA STATE STATUTE
"OPERATION OF INTERPRETED AS VARIATIONS IN THE
AIRCRAFT" IMPOSING VICARIOUS APPLICATION OF
PROVISION LANGUAGE LIABILITY ON OWNER VICARIOUS LIABRLITY
IN STATE OF AIRCRAFT FOR ON OWNER OF
STATE AERONAUTICS CODE PILOT NEGLIGENCE AIRCRAFT




injury or damage to
person or property
on the ground or
water in the state,
unless injury caused





New Mexico No No N/A
New York No Yes N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 251 (McKinney
1968) owner (or
lessee for more than
30 days) vicariously
liable for injury or
damage to persons
or property within
or above the state





N. Carolina Yes. N.C. GEN. No. Broadway v. N/A
STAT. § 63.1(16) Webb, 462 F. Supp.
(1981) 429 (W.D.N.C. 1977)
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ADOPTED CAA STATE STATUTE
"OPERATION OF INTERPRETED AS VARIATIONS IN THE
AIRCRAFT" IMPOSING VICARIOUS APPLICATION OF
PROVISION LANGUAGE LIABILITY ON OWNER VICARIOUS LIABILITY
IN STATE OF AIRCRAFT FOR ON OWNER OF
STATE. AERONAUTICS CODE PILOT NEGLIGENCE AIRCRAFT
N. Dakota No No N/A
Ohio No No N/A
Oklahoma No No N/A
Oregon No No N/A
Pennsylvania No No N/A
Rhode Island No State statute imposes a rebuttable
presumption of vicarious liability on the
owner for the pilot's negligence, rebuttable
by proof that owner was not in control of
the aircraft at the time of the accident.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1-4-3 (1976)
S. Carolina No Yes (Restricted) Vicarious liability
S.C. CODE § 55-3-60 only imposed for
(1976) injuries to persons
or property on the
ground.
S. Dakota No No N/A
Tennessee No No N/A
Texas No No N/A
1981] LIABILITY OF FIXED BASE OPERATORS
ADOPTED CAA STATE STATUTE
"OPERATION OF INTERPRETED AS VARIATIONS IN THE
AIRCRAFT" IMPOSING VICARIOUS APPLICATION OF
PROVISION LANGUAGE LIABILITY ON OWNER VICARIOUS LIABILITY
IN STATE OF AIRCRAFT FOR ON OWNER OF
STATE AERONAUTICS CODE PILOT NEGLIGENCE AIRCRAFT
Utah No No N/A
Vermont Yes. VT. STAT. ANN. No interpretation A second state
tit. 5, § 2(20) (1972) statute imposes
vicarious liability on
the owner or lessee
for injuries to
persons or property
on the ground only.
5 VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
5, § 224 (1972).
Virginia No No N/A
Washington No No N/A
W. Virginia No No N/A
Wisconsin No State statute imposes rebuttable
presumption of vicarious liability on owner
or lessee for injuries to persons or
property on ground. Vicarious liability
rebuttable by proof that owner or lessee
was free from negligence. WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 114.05 (West 1974).
Wyoming No WYo. STAT. § 10-4-303 (1977)-owner of
aircraft vicariously liable for actual
damages caused by forced landing of
aircraft on another's property.

